Washington and Lee Law Review
Volume 31

Issue 3

Article 3

Fall 9-1-1974

Some Random Thoughts On Judicial Restraint*
H. E. Widener, Jr.

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarlycommons.law.wlu.edu/wlulr
Part of the Jurisdiction Commons

Recommended Citation
H. E. Widener, Jr., Some Random Thoughts On Judicial Restraint*, 31 Wash. & Lee L. Rev. 505
(1974).
Available at: https://scholarlycommons.law.wlu.edu/wlulr/vol31/iss3/3
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Washington and Lee Law Review at Washington and
Lee University School of Law Scholarly Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Washington and Lee Law
Review by an authorized editor of Washington and Lee University School of Law Scholarly Commons. For more
information, please contact christensena@wlu.edu.

SOME RANDOM THOUGHTS
ON JUDICIAL RESTRAINT*

H. E.

WIDENER, JR.t

But what is government itself but the greatest of all reflections
on human nature? If men were angels, no government would
be necessary.If angels were to govern men, neitherexternal nor
internalcontrols on government would be necessary. In framing a government which is to be administered by men over
men, the great difficulty lies in this:you must first enable the
government to control the governed; and in the next place
oblige it to control itself.'
No more than a casual interest in current events, editorials,
speeches, and the ever present public opinion polls indicates a growing, if not general, uneasiness in the public mind as to a certain lack
of restraint on the part of the judiciary. The matter is brought to my
immediate attention by a proposed constitutional amendment to
make future federal judges responsible. 2 The amendment takes the
form of requiring reconfirmation every eight years, both for members
of the Supreme Court and for inferior federal courts. While it may be
argued that Senator Byrd's description of life tenure for the federal
judiciary as being the subject of "widespread dissatisfaction . . .
under which some judges are exercising dictatorial powers," may be
exaggerated, that point of view is more and more often expressed and
deserves the thoughtful consideration of scholars and the bench and
the bar, as well as the public. It is unfortunate that, as have alI
attempts to limit the independence of the judiciary, the amendment
comes at a time of domestic tumult. A significant part of the country,
for example, is up in arms over the abortion cases, and no sooner does
*This article is not designed to be, and is not, a model of definitive research. Even
if time and energy permitted, the few pages allotted by me to this most engrossing
subject would not half cover the introduction. I have tried to express and to some
extent explain a feeling I believe to be in the air and which may not be ignored. I hope
it is just the restlessness of the times, but I fear it is not. Any characterization I have
made of Supreme Court opinions ought not to be taken as critical, for such could
properly be considered impudence. Rather, it reflects my idea of their holdings and
predicted requirements, an occupational hazard for all inferior federal judges. My
heavy reliance on dissenting opinions is not accidental. Dissenters rarely ride the
current.
tJudge, United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit.
'THE FEDERALIST No. 51 (J. Madison) (Mentor ed. 1961).
2S.J. Res. 13, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. (1973). See also Introductory Remarks of Senator Harry F. Byrd, Jr., 119 CONG. Rsc. 4 (daily ed. Jan. 9, 1973).
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that subject disappear from the front pages than the impeachment
proceedings take its place. Both, of course, are highly emotional issues and impossible to divorce from politics. And I refer to politics
both in the partisan sense and as a subject which is susceptible of
political resolution. But in tranquil times, I submit, the public is not
too concerned with who governs, so long as they govern. It is during
times of discord that the imposition of will by public officers strikes
raw nerves. And this is particularly true when the will is exerted by
officers who are not responsible, for those who have been the object
of the will exerted are for practical purposes unable to strike back.
Reference to The Federalistand the other political papers of the
time indicates that Montesquieu's proposition that the judiciary
ought to be a separate branch of government had grown to an article
of faith in the colonies by the time of the American Revolution. Undoubtedly influenced by the discharge of Lord Coke by James I, the
Act of Settlement of 1688, supported by George IMl's granting of tenure beyond the life of the King making the appointment, had established tenure during good behavior as the standard for British judges.
The colonial judges, however, served at the pleasure of the King, and
this became one of the specific complaints in the Declaration of Independence: "He has made judges dependent on his will alone, for the
tenure of their offices, and the amount and payment of their salaries."
Against this background (perhaps too abbreviated as stated), and
of course in times quite as tumultuous as those in which we now live,
the Constitutional Convention at Philadelphia deliberately chose to
make the judiciary independent, its judges having life tenure subject
only to removal for want of good behavior.
While it has been argued that the doctrine, or custom, or theory,
however it may be called, of judicial restraint has its historical
antecedents in the common law, on the one hand, and in the separation of powers on the other, I think, so far as the theory applies to
American courts, it can only fairly be said its historical antecedents
are in the common law as well as in the Constitution; and not only
in the Constitution as it separates the three parts of government into
separate branches, but also as it establishes our federal system of
separate national and state governments. Both the separation of powers of the departments of the national government and the separation
of powers between the national and the state governments were considered by the Framers as checks on the abuse of power. "This policy
of supplying, by opposite and rival interests, the defect of better
motives, might be traced through the whole system of human affairs,
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private as well as public .... In the compound Republic of America,
the power surrendered by the people is first divided between two
distinct governments and then the portion allotted to each subdivided among distinct and separate departments. Hence, a double
security arises to the rights of the people. The different governments
will control each other, at the same time that each will be controlled
'3
by itself."
It must be remembered that not all the plans of government submitted at Philadelphia provided for branches of government as separate as practically possible. Nor did all of the plans provide for the
federal system as we know it. Randolph's Virginia Plan, for example,
provided for a council of revision made up of "the Executive and a
convenient number of the National judiciary . . . with authority to
examine every act of the national legislature before it shall operate,
and every act of a particular legislature, before a negative thereon
shall be final; and the dissent of the said council shall amount to a
rejection, unless the act of the national legislature be again passed,
or that of a particular legislature be again negatived byof the
members of each branch." 4 Hamilton's plan provided that "the Governor or President of each State shall be appointed by the general
government, and shall have a negative upon the laws about to be
passed in the State of which he is Governor or President. ' 5 Charles
Pinckney's plan provided, in certain instances, that "the legislature
of the United States shall have the power to revise the laws of the
serveral states that may be supposed to infringe on the powers exclusively delegated by the Constitution for Congress, and to negative
and annul such as do." 6 Patterson's New Jersey Plan was less of a
revision of the Articles of Confederation with more powers reserved
to the states. 7 The plans of Patterson, Pinckney, and Hamilton contained express supremacy clauses, and Randolph's one of a sort which
was to be exercised by the legislature. All four plans, however, in
identical language, provided that the tenure of office for members of
the national judiciary should be "to hold their offices during good
behavior."
So, the life tenure of federal judges was no historical accident.
And neither was the relationship between the branches of the national government and the relationship between the states and the
nation. All were methodically and seriously considered at PhiladelrIHE

FEDERALIST

No. 51 (J. Madison).

'I ELLIOT'S DEBATES
'Id. at 180.
'Id. at 149.
Id. at 175.

144 (1937).
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phia, and each is a part of the fiber of government of the United
States.
As nullification and interposition were disposed of by Jackson in
1832, and ultimately at Appomattox, so a national government with
little or no restraint was earlier rejected at Philadelphia. Nowhere is
the proper relation between the national government and the states
better expressed than by Mr. Justice Black: "The concept does not
mean blind deference to 'States' Rights' any more than it means
centralization of control over every important issue in our national
government and its courts. The Framers rejected both these courses.
What the concept does represent is a system in which there is sensitivity to the legitimate interests of both state and national governments, and in which the national government, anxious though it may
be to vindicate and protect federal rights and federal interests, always
endeavors to do so in ways that will not unduly interfere with the
legitimate activities of the States."8
The Framers were concerned about concentration of power in one
hand and were convinced such concentration could lead only to tyranny. Madison, calling upon Jefferson, puts it this way: "All the
powers of government, legislative, executive, and judiciary, result to
the legislative body. The concentrating of these in the same hands is
precisely the definition of despotic government. It will be no alleviation that these powers will be exercised by a plurality of hands, and
not by a single one. One hundred and seventy-three despots would
surely be as oppressive as one. . . .[t]he legislative, executive, and
judiciary departments should be separate and distinct, so that no
person should exercise the powers of more than one of them at the
same time. * * * The conclusion which I am warranted in drawing
from these observations is that a mere demarcation on parchment of
the constitutional limits of the several departments is not a sufficent
guard against those encroachments which lead to a tyrannical concentration of all the powers of government in the same hands." 9 Hamilton expressed the same fear that a constitution violates "the fundamental principles of good government" when it "united all power in
the same hands."' 0 Eldridge Gerry's remark at Philadelphia, in opposing the "question for joining the judges to the executive in the
revisionary business," while more pungent and less philosophical,
was quite to the point. He "thought the executive, while standing
alone, would be more impartial than when he could be covered by the
'Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 44 (1971).
'THE FEDERALIST No. 48 (J. Madison).
"THE FEDERALIST No. 71 (A. Hamilton).
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sanction and seduced by the sophistry of the judges." 1 John Dickenson was of opinion that a joining of the executive and the judiciary
"involved an improper mixture of powers." "Secrecy, vigor, and dispatch," he said, "are not the principal properties required in the
executive. Important as these are, that of responsibility is more so,
which can only be preserved; by leaving it singly to discharge its
'1 2
functions.
And since the judiciary was deemed to be the weakest of the three
branches of government, possessing neither the purse nor the sword,
it had to be able to protect itself, and life tenure was the considered
answer. Hamilton put it this way: "That inflexible and uniform adherence to the rights of the Constitution, and of individuals, which
we perceive to be indispensable in the courts of justice, can certainly
not be expected from judges who hold their offices by a temporary
commission. Periodical appointments, however regulated, or by
whomsoever made, would, in some way or other, be fatal to their
necessary independence. If the power of making them was committed
either to the executive or legislative, there would be danger of an
improper complaisance to the branch which possessed it; if to both,
there would be an unwillingness to hazard the displeasure of either;
if to the people, or to persons chosen by them for the special purpose,
there would be too great a disposition to consult popularity to justify
a reliance that nothing would be consulted but the Constitution and
the laws."' 3 Madison was equally as emphatic: "Why was it determined that the judges should not hold their places by such a tenure?
[Appointment by the legislature] Because they might be tempted to
cultivate the legislature, by an undue complaisance, and thus render
the legislature the virtual expositor, as well as the maker of the
laws?"' 4 Life tenure as the assurance of the independence of the judiciary was thus agreed upon at Philadelphia in as studied a manner
as was the separation of powers of the branches of government and
the separation of powers of the state and national governments. It was
not finally accepted, however, without some misgivings. Dickenson
was not satisfied "as to the power of the judges to set aside the law."
At the same time, he was "at a loss what expedient to substitute,"
and warped "the justiciary of Arragon. . . .became by degrees the
law giver."'" And his motion to replace tenure during "good behavior"
"J.

MADISON, NOTES OF DEBATES IN THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF

Univ. 1966) [hereinafter cited as MADISON'S NOTES].
'2Id. at 81.
17rHE FEDERALIST No. 78 (A. Hamilton).
"MADISON'S NOTES at 311.
"Id. at 463.

1787, at 80 (Ohio
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with the words "provided that they may be removed by the executive
on the application by the Senate and House of Representatives""i was
defeated. Similar doubts along the same lines were expressed in the
debates on ratification. Mason asked: "After having read the first
section. . .what is there left to the State courts? Will any gentleman
be pleased, candidly, fairly, and without sophistry, to show us what
remains? There is no limitation. It goes to every thing. The inferior
courts are to be as numerous as Congress may think proper. They are
to be of whatever nature they please. Read the 2d section, and contemplate attentively the extent of the jurisdiction of these courts, and
consider if there be any limits to it."'" Spencer, of North Carolina,
voiced doubts which reverberate today: "There will be, without any
manner of doubt, clashings and animosities, between the jurisdiction
of the federal courts and of the state courts so that they will keep the
country in hot water. It has been said that the impropriety of this was
mentioned by some in the convention." 8 Such doubts from responsible critics were uniformly answered by assurances that the courts
created under the Constitution would be courts of limited jurisdiction, and the tenor of the replies is they should be models of restraint.
Hamilton: "The courts must declare the sense of the law; and if they
should be disposed to exercise WILL instead of JUDGMENT, the
consequence would equally be the substitution of their pleasure to
that of the legislative body." 1 Madison: "Now, sir, if there will be as
much sympathy between Congress and the people as now, we may
fairly conclude that the federal cognizance will be vested in the local
tribunals. . . .I have observed that gentlemen suppose that the general legislature will do every thing mischievous they possibly can, and
that they will limit to do every thing good as they are authorized to
do. If this were a reasonable supposition, their objections would be
good. I consider it reasonable to conclude that they will as readily do
their duty as deviate from it .. ."I'
". Spaight, of North Carolina:
"Mr. Chairman, the gentleman insinuates that differences existed in
the federal convention respecting the clauses which he objects to.
Whoever told him so was wrong; for I declare that, in that convention,
the unanimous desire of all was to keep separate and distinct the
objects of the jurisdiction of the federal from that of the state judiciary.'21
"Id. at 536.

'TIII
ELLIOT'S DEBATES 521 (1937).
"IVELLIOT'S DEBATES 136-37 (1937).
"'THE FEDERALIST No. 78 (A. Hamilton).
211 ELLIOT'S DEBATES 536 (1937).
21
1V ELLIOT'S Debates 139 (1937).
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It was also successfully argued that the judiciary, having neither
force nor will, must ultimately depend upon the aid of the executive
arm even for the efficacy of its judgments, and that the republican
principle demanded that the deliberate sense of the community
should govern the conduct of those to whom they entrust the management of their affairs."2 This latter argument sounds not unlike
Holmes' dictum that the taste of any public is not to be treated with
contempt, 23 and Learned Hand's observation, concerning lawyers,
that democracy is quick to understand those who respond to its fundamental feelings and ruthless to cast aside
those who seek cover
24
behind the protection of the written word.
With the background of a branch of government of limited powers
within a government of limited powers, and being represented as
courts of judgment with neither force nor will, where has the difficulty arisen? The problem is not new. It existed at the time of the
adoption of the Constitution as it exists today, and all attempts thus
far to limit the independence of the judiciary have generally failed.
The principal difficulty, I conceive, is the settled doctrine that a
federal judge has an equal duty to decide a case over which he has
jurisdiction with the duty not to decide the case if he does not have
jurisdiction. 25 In the context of today, the rule is brought to daily
public attention by Madison's statement that "the security for civil
rights must be the same as for religious rights. 126 The Constitutional
Convention rejected the council of revision as it rejected review by
Congress of the legislative acts of the states, and consciously threw
the matter of conflicting interests into the laps of the courts. This is
shown by Hamilton in No. 78 of The Federalist.
From this as a starting point, I will briefly mention some of the
doctrines which, sometimes by other names, I believe have contributed to the uneasy feeling on the part of many that the day-to-day
affairs of government are more properly conducted by responsible
officials rather than those enjoying life tenure. They are the doctrines
of substantive due process; the hands-off rule of the courts as they
may hear political questions; and the extension of the federal power
to regulate every petty local official as a result of the construction of
42 U.S.C. §1983. I speak not to the merits of the decisions themselves
for they are already on the books. Taken together, though, whether
right or wrong, they show a drift toward judicial intervention which
may not be ignored.
I'HlE FEDERALIST

No. 78 (A. Hamilton).

2Bleinstein v. Donaldson Lithographing Co., 188 U.S. 239, 252 (1903).
2
'Hand, The Speech of Justice, 29 HARV. L. RPv. 617 (1916).
2'Cohens
v. Virginia, 19 U.S. 264, 404 (1821).
2
UTHE FEDERALIST No.

51 (J. Madison).
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In a number of earlier cases decided under the Fourteenth Amendment, the Supreme Court had, with some regularity, invalidated
state laws, substituting in the name of due process what some have
called its own notions of public policy for legislative choices in social
and economic legislation.2 7 But, in 1963, the Court, in Ferguson v.
Skrupa,28 purported to sound the death knell for the doctrine of substantive due process. Justice Black stated it: "We have returned to
the original constitutional proposition that courts do not substitute
their social and economic beliefs for the judgment of legislative bodies, who are elected to pass laws. 129 In so doing, the Court gave credence to Holmes' earlier admonition that "the Constitution is made
for people of fundamentally differing views, and the accident of our
finding certain opinions natural and familiar or novel and even shocking ought not to conclude our judgment upon the question whether
statutes embodying them conflict with the Constitution of the United
States."30
But recent examples of judicial intervention in matters of legislation appear to signal a return to the principles of substantive due
process discarded in Skrupa. In 1965, the Court held, in Griswold v.
Connecticut,3" that a Connecticut statute forbidding the use of contraceptives by married couples violated a constitutional right to privacy. And in two cases decided in 1973, Roe v. Wade 2 and Doe v.
Bolton,3 the court imposed such severe limits on permissible legislation that no abortion law in the United States remained valid. In each
of these cases, the Court, in varying degrees, gave substantive content
to the term "liberty" in the Fourteenth Amendment's due process
clause in protecting what it termed fundamental values, although not
specifically stated in the Bill of Rights. In so doing, however, did not
the Court significantly increase the risk of the Third Branch substituting its judgment for that of the legislature in determining what is
wise public policy? Again, turning to Holmes: "I think the proper
course is to recognize that a state legislature can do whatever it sees
fit to do unless it is restrained by some express prohibition in the
Constitution of the United States or of the state, and that courts
"See, e.g., Adkins v. Children's Hosp., 261 U.S. 525 (1925); Coppage v. Kansas,
236 U.S. 1 (1915); Adair v. United States, 208 U.S. 161 (1908); Allgeyer v. Louisiana,
165 U.S. 578 (1897).
28372 U.S. 726 (1963).
"Id. at 730.
"Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 76 (1905) (Holmes, J., dissenting).
31381 U.S. 479 (1965).
32410 U.S. 113 (1973).
33410 U.S. 179 (1973).
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should be careful not to extend such prohibitions beyond their obvious meaning by reading into them conceptions of public policy that
the particular court may happen to entertain."3 Indeed, even the
1972 opinion in Furmanv.Georgia,3" which held the death penalties
of forty states invalid, might be mentioned in this context. Although
a majority of the Justices relied on the Eighth Amendment prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment, the result was a substitution of its own opinion of the morality and efficacy of the death
penalty for that of the legislatures. And the case may as easily have
been decided under the label of substantive due process. As Justice
Powell observed: "In terms of the constitutional role of this court, the
impact of the majority's ruling is all the greater because the decision
encroaches upon an area squarely within the historic prerogative of
the legislative branch-both state and federal- to protect the citizenry through the designation of penalties for prohibitable conduct.
It is the very sort of judgment that the legislative branch is competent
' Surely, judicial
to make and for which the judiciary is ill-equipped."36
self-restraint is an implied condition of the Constitution's grant of
judicial review. But, as recent opinions tend to indicate, this implied
condition may be honored of late as much in the breach as in its
observance.
Concededly, from its earliest opinions, the Supreme Court has
recognized that certain disputes, regarded as "political questions,"
do not lend themselves to judicial standards and judicial remedies.
To classify an issue as falling within the definition of political questions, however, as Justice Frankfurter notes, is more a form of stating
a conclusion than revealing of analysis." In determining whether a
question falls into that category, "the appropriateness under our system of government of attributing finality to the action of the political
departments and also the lack of satisfactory criteria for a judicial
determination are dominant considerations."38 One commentator has
probably too broadly defined as political "[a]ll those matters of
which the court, at a given time, will be of the opinion that it is
impolitic or inexpedient to take jurisdiction. . . questions so bitterly
contentious as to be, for the moment, incapable of resolution."39 And
another has concluded that the non-justiciability of a political question is founded primarily on the doctrine of separation of powers and
3Tyson & Bros. v. Banton, 273 U.S. 418, 445-46 (1927) (Holmes, J., dissenting).
=408 U.S. 238 (1972).
1Id. at 418 (Powell, J., dissenting).
"Baker v. Carr, 369 U. S. 186, 281 (1962) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
"Coleman
v. Miller, 307 U.S. 433, 454 (1939).
3
Finklestein, Judicial Self-Limitation, 37 HARV. L. Rav. 338, 344-45 (1924).
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the policy of judicial self-restraint. 5 In this vein, Justice Frankfurter
once noted "[tihe court's authority-possessed neither of the purse
nor the sword-ultimately rests on sustained public confidence in its
moral sanction. Such feeling must be nourished by the Court's complete detachment, in fact and appearance, from political entanglements and by abstention from injecting itself into the clash of political forces in political settlements."'"
The antecedents of the political question doctrine lie in the com42
mon law. In a major case, the Duke of York's Claim to the Crown,
in 1460, the style of which is descriptive of the subject matter, English
courts refused to decide a case they considered basically political.
The doctrine thus enunciated by English courts was inherited in this
country and articulated in Marbury v. Madison, Chief Justice Marshall observing that "[q]uestions in their nature political, or which
are, by the Constitution and laws, submitted to the executive, can
never be made in this court."43 And in 1839, Justice McLean, in
Williams v. Suffolk Insurance Co., made a similar pronouncement
"that the action of the political branches of the government in a
matter that belongs to them, is conclusive." 44
The first important case to apply the doctrine of judicial noninterference to political questions was Luther v. Borden.45 The issues
in that case arose out of Dorr's Rebellion in Rhode Island in 1841-42.
Thomas W. Dorr had apparently been elected governor under a government organized by a popular assembly without regard to the existing charter government. The existing government was then sued for
trespass by one of Dorr's supporters for acts done in pursuance of its
declaration of martial law. Excitement ran high, and the issue divided the country. Daniel Webster served as counsel for the charter
government. In order to decide the case on its merits, the Supreme
Court was called upon to determine which of the two governments
properly represented the State of Rhode Island. But the Court refused
to decide the question, stating that, under Article IV of the Constitution guaranteeing to each state a republican form of government, it
rests with Congress to decide which government is established in a
state. 4
4

Wright, FEDERAL COURTS § 14 (2d ed. 1970).
"Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 267 (1962) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
125
Rotuli Par. 375 (1460), reprintedin WAMBAUGH,

CASES ON CONSTrrTONAL LAW

1 (1915). See also Nabob of the Carnatic v. East India Co., 1 Ves. Jr. 370 (1791), 2
Ves. Jr. 56 (1793).
131Cranch 137, 170 (1803).
1113 Pet. 415, 420 (1839).
"17 How. 1 (1849).
"Id. at 45.
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It has been said that what is and what is not a political question
defies classification. But it is important that courts have felt that,
like the legislatures, they have been given a mandate, and they must
act within its scope.
Recent years have witnessed a gradual erosion of the political
question doctrine, and a decline in the policies of judicial selfrestraint which underlie it. Most notable is Baker v. Carr7 which, in
1962, overturned earlier precedents, including Colegrove v. Green,4"
which had held congressional redistricting controversies nonjusticiable. In Colegrove, the Court had reasoned "that the Constitution has
conferred upon Congress exclusive authority to secure fair representation by the States in the popular House and left to that House determination whether States have fulfilled their responsibility ...
Whether Congress faithfully discharged its duty or not, the subject
has been comitted to the exclusive control of Congress. . . . Courts
ought not to enter this political thicket."49 But in Baker v. Carr,the
Court found the same controversy justiciable as it applied to the
legislature of a state, relying not on the guarantee of a republican
form of government, but on the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. As a practical matter of fact, as Justice Frankfurter contended in dissent, Baker was nonetheless a Guarantee
Clause claim masquerading under a different label." In all events, the
considerations of federal-state relationships and the separation of
powers, found controlling in Colegrove, were finally discarded in favor
of judicial intervention in matters of legislative redistricting. Similarly, in Powell v. McCormack,5' decided in 1969, the Court brushed
aside a number of substantial political question objections and held
that Congressman Adam Clayton Powell, Jr., had been unlawfully
excluded from the House. The Court found that in judging the qualifications of its members, as contrasted with excluding them, Congress
is limited to the standing requirements of age, citizenship and residence contained in Article I, §2 of the Constitution. The importance
of the ruling in Powell, of course, is that the Court forbade the House
to decide whether it was acting in excluding a member or failing to
seat him. And it equally forbade the House to decide the meaning of
the clause that "[e]ach house shall be the judge of the. . . qualifications of its own members .
Does Powell have unarticulated
"7369 U.S. 186 (1962).
4s328 U.S. 549 (1946).
"Id. at 554, 556.
11369 U.S. at 297.
51395

U.S. 486 (1969).

5'U.S. CONST. art. I, §5.
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holdings of vast and far-reaching political consequences which do not
appear on the surface of the opinion? Is it a necessary holding that
the House does not have jurisdiction to determine its own jurisdiction,53 without which power no court could operate? Assuming such
is not the holding of Powell, is it then a necessary holding that the
determination by the House of its own jurisdiction is subject to judicial review, thus treating the House in the same manner as an inferior
court rather than as a part of a coordinate branch of government?
Does reaching the merits in Powell indicate there is no subject exclusively entrusted to a coordinate branch of government which is not
subject to judicial review? 53. I The explosive consequences of articulated answers to these questions may easily make the controversial
decisions of the court for the last twenty years seem like a Sunday
School picnic. Whatever the merits of Baker and Powell, by requiring
a consideration of them the court has shown a tendency to get rid of
its historic reluctance to consider matters which had been thought by
many to have been the exclusive prerogative of another branch of the
national government or of the governments of the States.
The Civil Rights Acts were passed shortly after the Civil War to
insure the protection of recently freed slaves. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 prohibits any person, under color of state law, from denying to another
his constitutional rights, and was rarely used for access to the federal
courts until the dam was burst by Monroe v. Pape.4
In Monroe, the City of Chicago and thirteen policemen were sued
for allegedly breaking into petitioner's home during the early morning
hours. The family was ousted from bed at gunpoint. Monroe was
forced to stand naked in the living room while the entire house was
ransacked, whereupon he was taken to the police station, held incommunicado for ten hours, never arraigned before a magistrate, and was
ultimately released with no charges against him. All this was done
without a search or arrest warrant. The Court held that the City of
Chicago was not a "person" under § 1983, and so affirmed dismissal
as to the city, but held the conduct of the named police officers, even
though contrary to state law, was state action within the meaning of
the Fourteenth Amendment and violated the due process clause. This
despite the fact that plaintiff could have sued in a state court for
assault, battery, false arrest, or false imprisonment.
The court listed the three main aims of the act as: (1) overriding
certain kinds of state law; (2) providing a remedy when state law is
inadequate; and (3) providing a remedy when the state recourse is
Texas & P. Ry. v. Gulf, C. & S. F. Ry., 270 U.S. 266, 274 (1926).
1
U.S. , 94 S. Ct. 3090 (1974). See Addendum at the
end of this article.
-365 U.S. 167 (1960).
3.Cf. U.S. v. Nixon, -
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adequate in theory but unavailable in practice 5 Three years later,
in McNeese v. Board of Education,5 a fourth purpose was added, to
provide a federal court remedy supplementary to any state court
remedy.
Since Monroe, as pointed out in a fine law review article by Judge
Aldisert of the Third Circuit,- there has been a rush to the federal
courts at the expense of state courts, for it is clear that state court
remedies need not be exhausted before suing in federal court. 8 The
Court, in 1972, also extended the reach of § 1983 by overruling Hague
v. CIO,59 which had limited the "rights, privileges, or immunities"
protected by § 1983 to those involving personal liberty. In Lynch v.
Household Finance Corp., 0 the Court abolished the Hague distinction between rights of property and personal liberty; furthermore, the
Court resolved any doubt as to a conflict between the jurisdictional
statute for § 1983, 28 U.S.C. § 1343(3), and the general federal question jurisdiction provision, 28 U.S.C. § 1331, by saying that §1343(3)
is compatible with the latter, but is more narrow and applies only to
alleged infringements under "color of state law."'" The net result is
that plaintiffs suing under § 1983 do not have to meet the $10,000
jurisdictional limitation of the general statute. Thus, Monroe and the
cases following, as Judge Aldisert rightly has noted, have transformed
many nickel-and-dime torts, traditionally pursued under state law,
into Fourteenth Amendment deprivations, at least insofar as jurisdiction is concerned.
The Supreme Court again broadened the effect of § 1983 when it
resolved a conflict among the circuits 2 and held in Mitchum v.
Foster 3 that § 1983 was an express statutory exception to the federal
anti-injunction statute, 28 U.S.C. § 2283. Following Mitchum, in a
suit filed alleging injury under color of state law, the inferior federal
courts may no longer consider the anti-injunction statute as a bar to
federal court interference by way of injunction in state proceedings,
-Id. at 173-74.
-'373 U.S. 668, 672 (1963).
'7Aldisert, JudicialExpansion of FederalJurisdiction:A FederalJudge's Thoughts
on Section 1983, Comity and the Federal Caseload, 1973 ARiz. ST. U.L.J. 557.
"Wilwording v. Swenson, 404 U.S. 249 (1971); Damico v. California, 389 U.S. 416
(1967).
42307 U.S. 496 (1939).
-405 U.S. 538 (1972).
"Id. at 547.
"Compare Cooper v. Hutchinson, 184 F.2d 119 (3d Cir. 1950) (§1983 is an "expressly authorized" exception), with Baines v. City of Danville, 337 F.2d 579 (4th Cir.
1964) (§1983 is not an "expressly authorized" exception).
-407 U.S. 225 (1972).
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but must consider the merits of each case, and either grant or deny
injunctive relief depending on whether the certain exceptional circumstances set out in Younger v. Harris," and its allied cases, have
been met. I think it apparent that this construction of the antiinjunction law for suits sounding in §1983 has made the federal judicial presence more frequently felt in the state courts, and the more
often felt, albeit discretionary, the greater chance for resentment,
whether justifiable or not.
I have touched on only three of the many facets of the ever expanding federal jurisdiction and paused at each only long enough to
highlight the problems each brings to mind as it may respect judicial
restraint. Where have the decisions led us, and where are they leading
us? A concentration of power in one hand, which must be considered
amoral according to our principles of republican government, was not
only noticed in the early days of the republic but also has been taken
account of in quite recent years. Mr. Justice Douglas, in his concur5
ring opinion in Flast v. Cohen,"
noted the danger but brushed it
aside: "A contrary result in Frothinghamin that setting (the "heyday
of substantive due process") might well have accentuated an ominous
trend to judicial supremacy." 6 And, in his dissenting opinion in the
same case, Mr. Justice Harlan argued, without avail, the same point:
"It seems to me clear that public actions, whatever the constitutional
provisions on which they are premised, may involve important hazards for the continued effectiveness of the federal judiciary. Although
I believe such actions to be within the jurisdiction conferred upon the
federal courts by Article I of the Constitution, there surely can be
little doubt that they strain the judicial authority. There is every
reason to fear that unrestricted public actions might well alter the
allocation of authority among the three branches of Federal Government. 6 7 In his dissent in Baker v. Carr, Mr. Justice Frankfurter
sounded a similar warning: "Such a massive repudiation of the experience of our whole past in asserting destructively novel judicial
power demands a detailed analysis of the role of this Court in our
constitutional scheme. Disregard of inherent limits in the effective
exercise of the court's 'judicial Power' not only presages the futility
of judicial intervention in the essentially political conflict of forces by
which the relation between population and representation has time
out of mind been and now is determined. It may well impair the
"1401 U.S. 37
-392 U.S. 83
"Id. at 107.
(1923).
1'392 U.S. at

(1971).
(1968).
Justice Douglas referred to Frothingham v. Mellon, 262 U.S. 447
130.
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Court's position as the ultimate organ of 'the supreme Law of the
Land' in that vast range of legal problems, often strongly entangled
in popular feeling, on which this Court most pronounce."6
While it is true that the substantive claims in the cases letting
down the historic barriers may appear attractive on their face to substantial segments of the community and thus reaching their merits,
to many, seems justified, I do not think a continued trend in this
direction may be sustained without accounting in any way to the
expressions of philosophical suspicion so ably voiced by Madison and
Hamilton and Holmes, and Douglas and Harlan and Frankfurter.
Certainly, whether or not we may agree with the ideology of any one
of them, we can all agree that few deeper thinkers upon the system
of government of this compound republic of America have ever lived.
And the fact that the suspicion of each has been aroused by a concentration of the power of government in one hand should give us pause.
Is there a solution? Of course. But the solution is not to say that
the federal courts must avoid all the hard, or unpleasant, or distasteful questions. Again, Hamilton makes this clear in The Federalist,
No. 80. And courts may not, in all questions of public import or
interest, simply enter an order consistent with the feelings of the
times. They may not succumb "whenever a momentary inclination
happens to lay hold of a majority of their constituents incompatible
with the provisions in the existing Constitution." 9
But the inferior federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction,
and if it is the considered sense of Congress that they are exercising
will instead of judgment, which seems to me to be a fair statement
of the general complaint, Congress may as easily strip them of their
jurisdiction as it has established them. This is a constitutional course
which has been advocated quite recently by knowledgeable men in
at least one controversial field.70 Certainly the regulation by Congress
of the jurisdiction of the federal courts was within the contemplation
of the framers.7 ' And such limitations on the powers of the federal
courts are frequent, some of the better known being the antiinjunction provisions of the Norris-LaGuardia Act 7 2 and the Internal
11369 U.S. at 267.
'THE FEDERALIST

No. 78 (A. Hamilton).

"0See S.R. 3833, 92d Congress, July 24, 1972, by Senators Hruska and Scott, which
would drastically limit the procedural rulings of Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391 (1963). Pay
is the case which opened the door to the now widespread collateral attacks on state
convictions in federal district courts.
NI ELLIOT'S DEBATES 536 (1937).
7"29 U.S.C. § 104.
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Revenue Code,7 3 not to mention the Anti-Injunction Act.
But this may not be the complete solution. In company with others, I am aware there is a feeling in a substantial part of the community that the courts are simply not being as reserved as the public
expects them to be. Whether or not the feeling is justifiable or a
majority may be debated, but the fact that the feeling is there is
undeniable, and the fact that it does exist, as contrasted to the reasons for its existence, may itself forecast heavy sailing in the days
ahead for the Article III judges. Trying to track down the feeling is
like hunting a will-o'-the-wisp, and I have concluded it is impossible.
But it has to do with the fact that there is a good deal of talk among
the public, and particularly among the lawyers, which may be expressed as a feeling that recurrences to fundamental principles 7 are
too infrequent, or something along that line. The matter not only
defies definition; it very nearly defies description. A good bit of the
feeling I believe has been brought about without the fault of anyone
by our age of instantaneous communication. The immediacy of a
television news broadcast and its impact on the people may not be
overstated. When this is coupled with the extensions of federal jurisdiction (both by the courts and Congress), the modern rush to class
actions, the increasing propensity to litigate, and the ease of access
into the federal district courts, it is apparent that the effect of court
decisions on the general public, which only a few years ago would take
months or years to filter down, or never be felt personally, now is felt
by millions of members of the public the day the order is entered.
Thus, the controversial position of the courts is today exposed, where
before it was hidden, and being in a controversial position as public
officers, the judges have and ought to share criticism for their acts
the same as any other person employed by the public.
The alteration of the terms of the judges of course, as a long range
effect, could only make them less independent. It is radical surgery
and a pronounced, deep and far-reaching change in our constitutional
plan. Whether it is justified or not is a political question of which the
public, the States, and the Congress must be the ultimate judges, as
they were at Philadelphia.

-326 U.S.C. § 7421.
1428
U.S.C. § 2283 (1970).
7
The phrase is found at least as early as article 13 of the Virginia Declaration of
Rights in 1776, and article XIX of the Constitution of Massachusetts in 1779.
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ADDENDUM*
The recent case of United States v. Nixon, - U.S. -,
94 S.
Ct. 3090 (1974), held that the President of the United States has no
absolute privilege even for his personal conversations, upon a claim
of "generalized" need for confidentiality in presidential communications, as perhaps distinguished from military, diplomatic, or national
security matters. While recognizing the presumptive existence of a
qualified privilege, the Court flatly held that the judiciary, and not
the executive, has the final say as to whether or not the claim of
privilege is valid. The Court stated in part: ". . . the 'judicial power
of the United States' . . . can no more be shared with the Executive

Branch than the Chief Executive, for example, can share with the
judiciary the veto power." Id. at 3106. The background of this dispute
is at least as old as the trial of Aaron Burr. See United States v. Aaron
Burr, 25 Fed. Cas. 30 (No. 14,692 d) (C.C.D. Va. 1807).

*See note 53.1 supra.

